INTRODUCTION
From the many studies on taxation's effect upon charitable contributions arises the stylized fact that the 'tax-price' (defined below) elasticity of giving exceeds unity. If true, then the federal policy of allowing households to deduct contributions from taxable income causes more to be contributed than is lost to the treasury in foregone tax revenue.
Recent work using panels of tax data, however, suggests that the long-run tax price elasticity may be substantially lower than unity. In this case the deduction is inefficient in that the long run loss to the federal treasury exceeds the gains to charities, so that it is less costly for the government to remove the deduction and provide the funds or services directly.
Here we address this issue using cross-sectional household data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) to estimate the price elasticity of all deductible contributions. A common solution to problems caused by the large percentage of noncontributors in the sample is to use, for example, methods such as Tobit or the twostage method of Heckman. Specification tests, however, reject the assumptions necessary for the consistency of these estimates. This casts doubt upon the result that tax-price elasticities estimated with these maximum likelihood methods exceed unity, even when using variables designed to capture the same long run features as the panel data.
When using the semiparametric method of Ahn and Powell (1993) -which consistently estimates parameters without making analogous assumptions -we find an elasticity estimate similar to those found using panel data. This suggests that high tax-price elasticities in previous work with cross-sectional data may be as much a function of specification error as the lack of a time component.
However, our data allows us to estimate the elasticity of contributions to social welfare organizations. This more closely matches the definition of giving needed to measure efficiency because the other major recipient of contributions, religious organizations, cannot receive government expenditures as a substitute for private donations. Semi-parametric estimates using this definition find an elasticity greater than one. Therefore, while it is possible that many previous estimates of the elasticity are too high, the deduction for contributions may still be treasury efficient.
THE MODEL
We are interested in estimating a model of contributions C i * :
(1)
where Y i is permanent income, Z i is a vector of demographic variables and P i is the taxprice of charitable giving. The variable χ i represents a first stage in which the household chooses to contribute if the utility U(C i ,X i ,T i ,Z i ) from giving exceeds the utility from not giving. That is,
where the function I [•] is an indicator function equal to one if the condition is true and zero otherwise and ν i is independent and identically distributed (iid) with mean zero.
An variable unique to this first stage is T i , the level of giving by the government. The coefficients on these variables can therefore be interpreted as elasticities. One reason for interest in the price elasticity is the idea of "treasury efficiency". The subsidy to contributions due to their deductibility is deemed "treasury efficient" if the revenue loss to the treasury from the subsidy is less than the contributions it induces. The removal of a treasury efficient subsidy while holding recipients harmless to the change by substituting government payments would therefore result in a net loss to the treasury.
The intuition relating this concept to price elasticity derives from observing that for contributions C and a flat tax rate m, the treasury loses m×C from the deduction. The deduction then raises more in contributions than is lost if
Noting that dC/dm = -dC/d(1-m) and rearranging,
where P = (1-m) for itemizers. Therefore, a price elasticity greater than 1 in absolute value indicates treasure efficiency.
ESTIMATION METHODS
Because a large proportion of the households make no contributions, using simple generalized least squares on either the whole sample or on households that contribute will produce inconsistent parameter estimates since χ i ε i can be decomposed as follows:
where η i has both a conditional and unconditional expectation equal to 0 and U i (C i *) In addition to the sample selection problem we must include a correction for the endogeneity of the price variable. Because contributions are deductible from federal taxation and the tax rate varies with income net of deductions, the tax rate facing the household tax-price may be written as
where δ i is one if the household itemizes and zero otherwise, and m(⋅) is the marginal tax rate function. Therefore, because P i is a function of C i , it is correlated with ε i . The standard solution to this problem is to use the "first dollar" tax price -the tax price if contributions were zero -as an instrument for the "last dollar" tax price -the actual tax price of the household. We incorporate this solution into the tobit model by using the full information maximum likelihood method described in Greene (1995) . This is essentially a two equation system: one equation for the instrumental variable regression and one for the charitable giving regression. As an alternative we incorporate the instrumental variable into the two-stage Heckman model by using the model of Lee, Maddala and Trost (1980) . In this model there is a first stage selection equation and a second stage system of equations similar to the Greene model.
One drawback to both the tobit and Heckman models is that a failure of the distributional assumptions on ε i and ν i makes the model's coefficient estimates biased and inconsistent. An alternative is use a semiparametric procedure whose estimates are consistent without requiring specific densities for ε i and ν i .
To this end we use the two stage estimation procedure established by Ahn and Powell (1993) . Unlike other semiparametric models such as those of Ichimura and Lee (1991) or Chen and Lee (1998) Instead, the Ahn and Powell method estimates the index χ i using a kernel regression. Unlike the Heckman method, the results from the first stage are then used to create weights in the estimation of (4) using first differences of the data:
where, for example,
The essential idea of Ahn and
Powell is to use weights that are largest when λ ij is closest to zero and smallest when λ ij is furthest from zero. The selection effect is then reduced and, asymptotically, eliminated.
Formally, if the weights ω ijn satisfy the regularity conditions in Appendix 1 and the following properties:
then a generalized weighted least square regression of (5) produces consistent parameter estimates. Since the lack of parametric assumptions prevents us from identifying λ ij , ω ijn must be a function of something that is one-to-one with λ ij . If this is the case, then λ ij being close to zero implies that ω ijn will be non-zero.
To solve this problem, Ahn and Powell suggest that one nonparametrically estimate:
information about government expenditures to set the level of giving. 3 A sample of size 100 would then become a sample of size 100⋅99/2=495.
where χ i is defined in (2) as one for contributors and zero otherwise. Ahn and Powell
Although not discussed by them, this follows from the fact that
But because ν i is assumed to come from an i.i.d. distribution, if the probabilities are close it must be the case that F , where the sample size subscript notes that this estimate is a function of sample size. This is estimated as:
where h n is the window width (or "bandwidth") that approaches zero as the n approaches infinity and in our application K(⋅) is the standard normal kernel. Larger window widths create smoother regressions weighting observations more evenly. Smaller window widths create more flexible regressions by weighting observations near to i much more than distant observations. Letting
we use the left-hand side of (7) as the argument to a weighting function
where $ ω ijn is the nonparametric estimator of ω ijn and satisfies the properties in (6).
Because the window width b n converges to zero as n converges to infinity, for any nonzero constant c, lim n→∞ K(c/b n )=0. These conditions alone are sufficient for $ ω ijn to satisfy the conditions outlined in (6).
Denoting X i as the regressors to (5), and V i as X i except for the use of the firstdollar price as an instrument for the last dollar price, the parameter estimates to (4) are:
The resemblance of (9) to the standard instrumental variable estimator is reassuring and one can now readily see the intuition behind the consistency of (9). As the sample size increases, the differences in (10) and (11) that have nonzero selection effects, λ ij , have weights that converge to zero. Asymptotically, the only observations receiving weights are those for which the selection effect is zero and therefore the parameter estimates are consistent. However, there are three additional issues that need to be addressed when implementing this estimator.
First, this estimator requires the use of two kernel estimators which require order conditions to guarantee the consistency of the parameter estimates. Our initial implementation carefully ensured that the kernels satisfied the Ahn and Powell's order conditions listed in Appendix 1. This was later abandoned for a simple normal kernel because the parameter estimates were, as predicted by Powell, Stock, and Stoker (1989) , discontinuous functions of the bandwidth. Aside from the difficulty in meeting the order conditions one cannot satisfy the convergence conditions on the bandwidth in a single sample. Thus, we are faced with the problem of choosing the bandwidths.
The most common solution to this second problem is to "cross-validate" by choosing the bandwidth that minimizes the out-of-sample mean square error. This implied balancing between bias and variance makes sense in a model producing predicted values without parameter estimates. Here, however, cross validation is inappropriate for two reasons. First, our goal is to get a consistent estimate of β p and so choosing bandwidths to trade-off bias and variance in the predicted value of C i * is of no value.
Even asymptotically cross validation is questionable because the cross validated window width would converge at a rate such that the order of bias in the nonparametric estimators equals the order of the variance. This could easily violate the bandwidth regularity conditions described in Appendix 1. 4 Second, the computational burden of crossvalidation is very high: at ten minutes per regression it takes about 16 days to generate the out-of-sample mean square error for a single pair of bandwidths.
A third problem involves estimation of the covariance matrix. In this study our goal is to conduct hypothesis tests on the coefficients in (4). Unfortunately, Ahn and
Powell did not formally prove the consistency of their covariance matrix estimator. In addition, it is a fourth order U-statistic of kernel derivatives and therefore computationally burdensome.
We address the problems arising from using a simple kernel, bandwidth selection and the difficulty in performing hypothesis tests with a nonparametric bootstrap, using the percentile bootstrap method of Hall (1992) . Following MacKinnon and Smith (1998),
we use the bootstrap to estimate the finite sample bias from using a simple kernel and selecting a bandwidth without cross-validation, which is then subtracted from the parameter estimates. The bootstrap thus aids the use of a simple kernel and our bandwidth selection method, described below, by reducing the finite sample bias inherent in nonlinear estimators. It also relieves the problem of hypothesis testing by allowing us to construct confidence intervals.
Denoting α = .05 as the significance level of these confidence intervals, we choose B=999 samples from the original sample using sampling with replacement. These choices make (α/2)(B+1) an integer so that the 50th largest and smallest coefficient estimates correspond to the .05 and .95 percentiles. Letting j index the bootstrap sample, we denote the j th estimated parameter vector by β j * and the estimated finite sample bias as For more information on this algorithm, see Appendix 2.
Contributions are defined as contributions to religious, educational and social welfare organizations. As described previously, the tax-price of giving is one for nonitemizers and one minus the applicable marginal tax rate for itemizers. It is defined as Although a measure of current income exists, we instead use a measure of permanent income: the sum of all household expenditures except charitable giving. For examples of this approach in general, see Prais and Houthakker (1971) . For an example of this with the use of the CEX, see Nelson (1989) .
Unlike tax data, the CEX includes variables for age, education, and race of the head of household, all of which are included here. To allow for the effect of government expenditures upon the probability of making a contribution, we include a variable made up of the per capita government expenditures on AFDC, Supplemental Security Income, and Food Stamps in the household's metropolitan statistical area.
RESULTS
In this section we show that price elasticity estimates from several parametric methods exceed unity while the semi-parametric estimate does not. However, standard tests of the distributional assumptions necessary for the consistency of the commonly used Heckman and tobit estimators strongly rejects the null hypothesis that we are using the correct distributions. This suggests that price elasticity estimates in much previous work are too high, although the semiparametric estimate is similar to low estimates found in recent work by Broman (1989) , Randolph (1995) and Barrett, McGuirk and Steinberg (1997) using tax file data. However, our initial definition of charity and the tax file definition includes religious giving. Here the idea of the federal government payments replacing private contributions -the thought experiment behind treasury efficiency -isn't realistic. When we restrict our definition to the more reasonable definition of giving to social welfare organizations, our elasticity estimate exceeds one. It is possible, then, that previous estimates are too high and that the charitable giving deduction is treasury efficient.
The coefficient estimates derived from using parametric regression methods on CHARITY, defined as giving religious, educational and social welfare organizations are listed in Table 2 . Because we use a log-linear model, the coefficient estimates on income and price can be interpreted as elasticities. The first two columns contain estimates from regressions using standard 2SLS methods on the entire dataset and on the set of contributors, respectively.
In the first column of Table 2 are the results from a naive 2SLS regression without considering the censoring problem. The estimate is significantly greater than unity. But because approximately 40 percent of the households do not give, these estimates should be biased and inconsistent. A 2SLS regression on just the observations is also biased, but produces an elasticity less than one, although not significantly so.
In the third column we list the results from the Heckman model of Lee, Maddala and Trost (1980) . Again the price elasticity estimate exceeds one, although it is insignificantly different from one. This estimate is only consistent if the normality assumption in the first stage is satisfied. But using the test of Bera, Jarque and Lee (1984) we find a statistic of 26.93, which is a rejection at any usual significance level for a χ 2 (2) distribution. This estimate is therefore biased and inconsistent.
As an alternative we use the full information maximum likelihood tobit model in Greene (1995) . This again yields an estimated price elasticity well in excess of one. This model, however, also relies on the assumption of normality of the disturbance. If this assumption is violated the estimates are biased and inconsistent. Using the test of Pagan and Vella (1989) for censored normality we find a statistic of 758, which is a rather strong rejection for a χ 2 (2) distribution.
This leaves the semi-parametric estimates, which are consistent without making assumptions about the distribution of the disturbances. But before describing the results the bandwidth selection method needs explanation. Our technique relies on the fact that plots of coefficient estimates as a function of bandwidths have a clear interpretation.
Specifically, when the bandwidths are very high the coefficient estimate is the same as 2SLS on the censored data. 6 This occurs because high bandwidths tend to weight data equally. As the bandwidths shrink, at some point the coefficient estimates change. This occurs because the estimated probability of selection, $ F i , begins to affect the weights $ ω ijn , which in turn differentially weight the observations.
As expected the coefficients invariably move towards their true values. In some cases this results in a "plateau", and in other times a "well", but in either case the top or bottom of this region comes closest to the true coefficient estimate. Still smaller bandwidths cause the parameter estimates to vary widely with the bandwidth. This is analogous to the sensitivity of coefficients estimated with a small number of observations: the addition or subtraction of a few observations can dramatically change the estimate.
In figure one we show the results of this experiment on our data. At the very high bandwidths one can see that the coefficient estimate for price is -0.73. This corresponds to the censored 2SLS estimate in Table 2 . At a sufficiently small pair of bandwidths we find a well. The bottom of this well represents our choice for bandwidths. Beyond this point one can see sharp fluctuations in the parameter values, as mentioned. Figure 2 plots the kernel density with the selected bandwidths as a function of income. Table 3 lists our bias-corrected parameter estimates and confidence intervals using our chosen bandwidths. The results are remarkably similar to those found from the censored 2SLS. The interpretation of this is that there is, in fact, very little selection bias and that the different estimates of the Heckman and tobit models are the result of misspecification of the likelihood function. Although not significantly below one, the coefficient estimate is well below the other estimates. Because our price and income variables are defined using a measure of permanent income, this estimate can be compared to the estimates of long-run elasticity found in Broman (1989 ), Randolph (1995 and Barrett, McGuirk and Steinberg (1997) . unity. This implies that the deduction may be treasury efficient.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we employ a semiparametric technique to estimate a model of charitable giving. Our results show that price elasticities are substantially lower with this method than with maximum likelihood methods. However, tests on the maximum likelihood models show that they are misspecified. The low elasticity estimates of the semi-parametric approach are similar to those produced from panel data and suggest that many previous estimates are too high. But if one takes the idea of treasury efficiency seriously, then the elasticity of giving to all sources is less meaningful than the elasticity of giving to social welfare organizations. Semi-parametric estimates using this definition find an elasticity greater than one. This implies that it is possible for many previous estimates of the price elasticity to be too high but still have the deduction for contributions be treasury efficient. The TPI algorithm links specific tax code parameters to income, expenditure, and demographic information for a calendar year. A detailed description of this algorithm is contained in Gillingham and Greenlees (1987) and Kokoski (1990) . Given the available household-specific information, the algorithm simulates the household's tax liability, including eligibility and amounts of tax credits, exemptions, and deductions at the 
